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ABSTRACT
This Article examines, evaluates, and prescribes improvements to a familiar form of constitutional construction
favored by neoformalists—the preference for rules over standards. Constitutional law development can be
understood as being composed of two judicial tasks—interpretation and construction. Judicial interpretation of
the Constitution involves determining the semantic meaning of the words contained in the document. Once that
semantic meaning is determined, the interpreted meaning must be constructed into legal doctrine for application in
court. Sometimes, that construction involves the articulation of the legal doctrines based on the interpreted
constitutional text that will govern a particular case and those similar to it. Legal neoformalists and legal realists
disagree as to how this latter form of construction should occur—the former preferring rules and the latter preferring
standards—but this portion of the “construction zone” is where the rules-versus-standards debate resides. This
Article refers to the formalist, or “rules,” side of the debate as neoformalist constitutional
construction. Neoformalist constitutional construction has many critics and defenders. But few, if any, scholarly
treatments seek to evaluate it in the real world of judging, or seek to tease out its ideal conditions. This Article
fills that gap by examining neoformalist constitutional construction on its own terms—whether it actually serves
neoformalist values, and under what conditions it might do so optimally. Employing a case study, this Article
shows that neoformalist constitutional construction is bound to fail, absent changes to two judicial practices: one,
the inordinate deference that lower courts grant to Supreme Court dicta; and two, the tendency of Supreme Court
justices to over-justify their rulings.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal theory can be organized around many ongoing disputes. One of
the most well-known is the dispute between legal formalists and legal realists.
This dispute has both descriptive and normative dimensions.1 The
descriptive dimension involves explanations for judicial decisions, pitting
judging based on applying objective legal sources to facts against judging that
is influenced by extra-legal factors, such as policy, politics, fairness, and
institutional concerns.2 The normative dimension has at least two prominent
strands—one that involves interpretative methodologies, and another that
involves the judicial craft—how judges should frame and compose their
decisions.3 In constitutional law, the former dimension plays out through
debates over originalism versus living constitutionalism. The latter pits the
preference for appellate judges to set forth their holdings in categorical rules

1

2

3

See Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism, 1–2, 9–10 (Stanford Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working
Paper No. 4, 1999), https://ssrn.com/abstract=200732 (last visited March 6, 2018) (contrasting
the discredited descriptive dimension with four versions of the normative dimension).
See, e.g., BRIAN TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 200–02 (2010) (critiquing
the distinction and arguing for a more nuanced view of the history of the formalist/realist debate);
Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111, 122 (2010)
(reviewing and critiquing Tamanaha’s book, but agreeing with the point that “mechanical
jurisprudence,” or what Leiter terms “vulgar formalism,” was not a widely-held view, even in
formalism’s early heyday).
See Grey, supra note 1, at 2 (terming the former “originalism” and the latter “objectivism”).
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against the preference for more flexible standards—the “rules versus
standards” debate.4
The descriptive dimension of formalism in its least flexible form—that of
so-called “mechanical jurisprudence”—has been discredited, if it ever truly
existed in the first place.5 But both strands of the normative dimension of
formalism are very much alive, and have recently been placed under the
label, neoformalism.6 Many scholars have addressed, and continue to address,
the interpretive strand of the normative dimension, mostly through
scholarship on constitutional originalism,7 and responses to this scholarship.
This Article, however, focuses attention on the judicial craft strand, taking as
its starting point Justice Antonin Scalia’s most influential articulation and
defense of this strand’s values.8
Justice Scalia’s “law of rules” formulation—which prefers that appellate
judges set down categorical rules, rather than more flexible standards, where
possible—occupies a particular place within the originalist methodology of
which he was also a strong proponent.9 Originalist scholars have shown that
constitutional law development can be understood as being composed of two
judicial tasks—interpretation and construction.10 Judicial interpretation of
the Constitution, for most modern originalists, at least, involves determining
the semantic meaning of the words contained in the document. Once that
semantic meaning is determined, the interpreted meaning must be
constructed into legal doctrine for application in court.11
4
5
6

7
8
9
10

11

See id. at 2–3 (arguing that there is tension between the textualist/originalist desire to comport with
original meaning which could require the use of standards, versus the objectivist’s desire for clear rules).
See infra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism,
and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 187–88 (2006) (outlining the idea of
neoformalism and distinguishing it from the earlier, discredited form); see also Grey, supra note 1, at
2 (same).
See infra Section II.A and sources cited therein.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 (1989)
(discussing a preference for predictability in judicial decisions and for the use of firm rules).
See id. at 1184 (linking the two explicitly).
See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004) (claiming constitutional construction is required because of the limits stemming
from the document itself); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) (charting the history of originalism); Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) (claiming that
constitutional construction is both ubiquitous and inevitable). This distinction was originally
derived from contract theory, but it has become a staple of originalist reasoning. See Solum, supra
at 467 (describing the birth of the “New Originalism,” and its incorporation of the distinction).
See Solum, supra note 10, at 468–69 (“In some cases, giving the text legal effect might be unmediated;
we read the text and put it into effect. But in other cases, the legal effect of the text is mediated by
doctrines of constitutional law. The text of the First Amendment includes the phrase ‘freedom of
speech’ but constitutional decisions are mediated by a plethora of constitutional doctrines,
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Sometimes, that construction involves gap filling or the resolution of
vagueness, ambiguity, or other under-determinacy in the semantic meaning
of the text.12 Other times, it involves the articulation of the legal doctrines
based on the constitutional text that will govern a particular case and those
similar to it.13 Legal formalists and legal realists disagree as to how this latter
form of construction should occur—the former preferring rules and the latter
preferring standards14—but this portion of the “construction zone” is where
the rules-versus-standards debate resides. Accordingly, this Article will refer
to the formalist, or “rules,” side of the debate as neoformalist constitutional
construction.15
The literature contains many critiques of neoformalist constitutional
construction,16 along with some defenses of it on normative grounds from
commentators other than Justice Scalia.17 But few, if any, scholarly
treatments seek to evaluate neoformalist constitutional construction in the
real world of judging, or to tease out its ideal conditions.18 This Article fills
that gap by examining neoformalist constitutional construction on its own
terms—whether it actually causes the predictability, uniformity of
application, and cabining of extra-legal factors in judicial decision making

12
13

14
15

16

17

18

including, for example, rules against prior restraints, rules governing public forums, and a complex
doctrine governing obscenity. When courts devise these doctrines as part of the process of
determining the legal effect of the ‘freedom of speech,’ they are engaging in constitutional
construction—in the sense stipulated here.”).
Id. at 469–72 (outlining several different forms of under-determinacy).
Id. at 474 (defining “Constitutional Construction” as “[a]n activity that is part of constitutional
practice and aims at the determination of the legal content of constitutional doctrine and/or the
legal effect to be give the constitutional text.”).
Grey, supra note 1, at 2, 9.
In truth, developing categorical rules is one part of neoformalist constitutional construction, with
the others being more contested, and at times shading away from originalism and neoformalism
and toward living constitutionalism and legal realism. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 724–25, 738–39 (2011) (pointing out that originalist construction,
as a way of resolving under-determinacy in the text, can shade into living constitutionalism); Martin
H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic
Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1509–10 (2012) (same).
For that reason, only the “rules vs. standards” question is examined here under this label, though
other forms of construction certainly fit within its bounds.
See, e.g., Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better for Capitalism
and Liberalism, 19 PUB. INT. L.J. 175, 175 (2010) (refuting the proposition that clear rules are more
advantageous than vague standards).
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Justice Scalia’s Originalism and Formalism: The Rule of Criminal Law as a Law of
Rules, in 187 HERITAGE FOUND. SPECIAL REP., THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA:
REMEMBERING A CONSERVATIVE LEGAL TITAN’S IMPACT ON THE LAW 5 (Elizabeth H. Slattery
ed., 2016), available at https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/the-legacy-justice-antonin-scaliaremembering-conservative-legal-titans-impact-the (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (praising Justice
Scalia’s neoformalist criminal law jurisprudence).
Raban, supra note 16, at 186, appears to come the closest, but his analysis is a conceptual one, rather
than a case study, as here, that tracks a change from a standards regime to a rule regime, and thus
can draw comparative conclusions.
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that it promises, and under what conditions it might do so optimally.
Part I develops the theory of neoformalist constitutional construction and
situates it within the primary neoformalist theory of constitutional judging,
which prominently relies on an “interpretation-construction distinction.”
Part I also identifies the assumptions about judging and judicial behavior
underlying neoformalist constitutional construction, illustrating that the
normative theory is at least partially based on a realist descriptive account of
judging, tempered by a formalist optimism about judicial behavior. It then
connects these assumptions with the thorny problem of distinguishing the
holding of a case from its dicta. Understanding this connection is vital to
understanding the success or failure of neoformalist constitutional
construction.
Next, in Part II, the Article reviews its test case, Garcetti v. Ceballos,19 a case
which made a profound alteration to the doctrine of public employee free
speech rights.20 This case is selected because it is nearly universally viewed
as an example of what this Article terms neoformalist constitutional
construction.21 The case employs a categorical rule of decision in a doctrinal
space that previously was governed only by a balancing test standard.22 That
is, it openly and deliberately pursues the values and employs the principal
method of neoformalist constitutional construction.
Part II analyzes the Garcetti decision in detail, isolating its holding from
both the dicta found in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and the many
propositions and characterizations of the Court’s decision found in the
dissents. Building on this analysis, Part III shows that the use of a categorical
rule to resolve Garcetti and to cabin lower court decision making in the public
employee speech context was defensible in its conception, but in its
implementation led to judicial behavior diametrically opposed to what
neoformalist theory would have predicted.
Part IV then postulates a reason for this unexpected result, along with a
prescription for reform. Neoformalist constitutional construction cannot

19
20

21

22

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
See generally Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 262 ED. L. REP. 357 (2011) (reviewing the then-extant Court of Appeals
decisions applying Garcetti in the public education context and finding a marked trend toward
reduced speech rights for public educational employees).
See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal
Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 1173, 1194–98 (2007) (criticizing Garcetti for creating a
formalist rule with “an underlying categorization that is more ambiguous than the prior standard”);
Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Public Employment
Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907, 911–912 (2011) (classifying Garcetti as a neoformalist decision).
See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (arguing that the Court should not have replaced
the Pickering-Connick balancing inquiry with the Garcetti test).
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succeed at serving its professed values unless the lower courts observe and
adhere to the categorical rules that the Supreme Court adopts, but the
analysis of Part IV shows that this adherence is impaired due to two flaws in
the Supreme Court’s decision making.23 One is the Court’s failure to
anticipate or appreciate the inordinate deference the lower courts grant to
the Court’s extraneous rhetoric—its dicta,24 and the compounding effect of
the Court’s overjustifying its rulings, which it did in Garcetti. The other is the
failure of the lower courts to properly appreciate their duty to act as a check
on the Court’s power from below, by adhering to strong stare decisis norms.
These two problems must be solved for neoformalist constitutional
construction to succeed on its own terms. Absent such changes, and
especially in developing rights-limiting speech doctrines, as in Garcetti, the
Court should prefer standards to rules.
I. NEOFORMALIST JUDGING
The debates between legal formalists and legal realists form some of the
most important, capacious, and longstanding disputes in legal theory. In
constitutional law, the disputes take both descriptive and normative forms,
and each of these forms has more than one dimension, with each of these
dimensions forming several sub-disputes. This Part briefly summarizes these
forms and dimensions, situating the rules-standards debate that is the subject
of this Article in its proper place within the overall “formalist-realist divide.”25
A. Judging in the “Construction Zone”
Broadly, the descriptive form of the formalist-realist debate pits
depictions of judging as mostly a rule-application process, where extra-legal
factors (i.e., those outside the facts of the case and the governing law) do little
to no adjudicatory work, against depictions of judging as a process involving

23

24

25

In addition to the flaws in judicial practices Part IV identifies, it is surely true that political
preferences, strategic thinking, and other explanations might be identified as impediments to rulefollowing in the lower courts. Neoformalist constitutional construction is in part directed at
minimizing, or even eliminating, these influences. If it does not do so, then it may be true that flaws
in the judicial craft and judicial practices are to blame, as posited here, or it may be true that
political ideology, strategic thinking, and other explanations are simply insurmountable elements
of judging. This Article proceeds from the former, more optimistic, view and leaves the evaluation
of that view to later empirical research.
See Pierre N. Leval, Judging under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1274–75
(2006) (arguing that, contrary to common judicial practice, lower courts “may not treat the
Supreme Court’s dictum as dispositive”); Scalia, supra note 8, at 1177 (taking it as given that lower
courts give deference to the Supreme Court’s “mode of analysis” in particular cases, regardless of the
“the theoretical scope of a ‘holding’”).
See TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 1–3 (coining this term to name the overall debate).
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both legal and extra-legal factors, such as politics, policy, judicial attitudes,
institutional norms, and other considerations, each of which might drive the
decision under the right circumstances.26
Descriptive legal formalists—mostly the group known as the “classic”
legal formalists of the late nineteenth century—posited that judging is (at least
mostly) a rule-application process, and that judges in most cases apply known
legal standards to resolve each case on its unique facts27—Chief Justice
Roberts’s “umpire” analogy is the popularized version of this theory.28
Descriptive legal realists, including the recently burgeoning group of
empirical social scientists studying judicial decision making, see judging as
much more (or even completely) influenced by factors outside the facts of the
case before the court and the applicable law.29 Their accounts have shown
that societal factors, judicial political preferences, collegial “peer” effects, and
institutional concerns, among other influences, have effects on the outcomes
of cases.30
As a descriptive matter, few today dispute that the legal realists have the
better case, at least when the subject of analysis is the appellate courts. Very
few dispute the mountains of empirical evidence that stand in support of the
proposition that appellate judging is not merely about the facts of a case and
the applicable law, but also involves nonlegal factors both intrinsic to the
judge (e.g., political leanings) and extrinsic to the judge (e.g., the institutional
role orientations of collegial court judges).31
The normative form of the debate has three primary dimensions, all
today grouped under the label, “neoformalism.”32 The interpretive

26
27
28

29
30

31
32

Id.
Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (1999).
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr, Nominee,
Chief Justice of the United States). As far as I can tell, the first use of the adjectival form of “umpire”
in legal scholarship was Judge Marvin Frankel’s. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975). Many have criticized the Chief Justice’s formulation,
see, e.g., Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 113, 124–25 (2010) (arguing that, although trial court judges resemble umpires in
many ways, Supreme Court Justices are better compared to the Commissioner of Baseball); see also
Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 n.3 (2009)
(listing articles that critique the analogy in this way); Zelinsky, supra, at 113 n.4 (same), but it
certainly speaks to one popular conception of the proper judicial role. That conception is
descriptively formalist.
See generally WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND
WHAT’S AT STAKE (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) (collecting scholarship on the topic).
See generally Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision
Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002) (commenting extensively on the state
of the scholarship and predicting emerging directions).
Id. at 833–39, 841–42.
See Solum, supra note 6.
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dimension involves the proper methods for deriving meaning from legal
sources, and this dimension has received a great deal of recent attention from
originalist constitutional law scholars, along with their theoretical
opponents.33 The applicative dimension encourages lower courts to strive to
apply clear rules from prior precedent and constitutional or statutory text,
rather than to seek fulfillment of extra-legal goals, such as fairness or
pragmatism.34 The constructive dimension encourages courts to fill
interpretive gaps in fidelity to the text and structure of authoritative sources,
and to develop doctrines of application wherever possible as rules, rather
than as standards.35
Interpretive neoformalists favor objective and predictable means of
interpretation. In the area of constitutional law, they generally favor some
form of originalist reasoning.36 They generally believe that the text of the
Constitution, read in light of the meaning that educated readers of that text
would have understood contemporaneously to its adoption, can supply the
necessary content to resolve most constitutional questions.37 In other words,
interpretive legal formalists reject the proposition that the Constitution
should be construed against its objectively determinable meaning to do
justice, conform with contemporary values, or serve important policy
concerns. Interpretive legal realists, in contrast, generally favor some
combination of methods that includes considerations of justice,
contemporary public policy, and contemporary social standards in
interpreting constitutional text, and this method is therefore often labeled as
“living constitutionalism.”38

33

34

35

36

37
38

Compare Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 418–20
(2013) (defending originalism as an interpretive theory), and Lawrence Solum, Originalism and
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 524–36 (2013) (same), with Bret Boyce,
Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 947–50 (1998) (critiquing
originalism on indeterminacy grounds), and Redish & Arnould, supra note 15, at 1511 (critiquing
originalism on conceptual clarity grounds).
See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Legal Formalism, Procedural Principles, and Judicial Constraint in American
Adjudication, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 23, 24 (Laura
Pineschi ed., 2015) (defining Justice Scalia’s formalism as “the idea that judges and other
decisionmakers should decide particular cases, to the extent possible, by the mechanical application
of existing legal rules.”).
See Grey, supra note 1, at 2 (situating rule articulation within neoformalism). See generally Randy E.
Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1 (2018)
(developing a theory based on fidelity to text and structure).
See Barnett, supra note 10, at 620–21 (outlining the shift from originalism to new originalism); Grey,
supra note 1, at 1–2 (explaining the four main sects of neoformalist constitutional interpretation);
Solum, supra note 6, at 187–88 (providing an overview of originalism’s history).
Solum, supra note 33, at 456–57 (understanding new originalism as a theory concerned with the
public meaning at the time of framing and ratification).
See Solum, supra note 6, at 156 (explaining that legal realism generally eschews stare decisis in favor
of policy or balancing relevant interests).

Dec. 2018]

NEOFORMALIST CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

447

The primary objection to originalism from living constitutionalists is that
the Constitution’s text often has a semantic meaning that is vague,
ambiguous, or otherwise under-determinate. The response of originalists to
this critique has been to draw from contract law theory and divide
constitutional meaning-making into two phases: interpretation and
construction.39
Interpretation involves deriving the semantic context of legally operative
texts—for purposes of this discussion, the Constitution.40 The currently
dominant group of originalists sees the original, publicly-understood
meaning of the words the Framers used as the best guide to this semantic
content. Today’s originalists generally concede that this semantic content
will sometimes be under-determinate of the legal question before the court,
though they disagree as to how often this will be so, and what to do when the
under-determinacy problem presents itself. 41
One prominent strand of originalists favors a second step at this point:
construction.42 Whereas interpretation involves determining the semantic
meaning of the text, construction involves determining the legal
consequences of that meaning. Where the meaning is not fully determined
through interpretation, construction attempts to complete the meaning using
other sources, such as structure and extant precedent.43 Where the meaning
is fully determined, or once these additional sources have completed the
meaning-making job, construction uses that meaning to develop rules of
decision for a pending case and those cases similar to it that will arise in the

39

40

41
42
43

See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 35, at 1 (arguing that judges enter into a fiduciary relationship
with private citizens when they take their oath to uphold the Constitution, requiring them to engage
in interpretation and construction, seeking to give legal effect to both the “letter” and “spirit” of the
Constitution); Solum, supra note 33, at 457 (defining “constitutional interpretation” as “the activity
that discerns the communicative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text” and
“constitutional construction” as “the activity that determines the content of constitutional doctrine
and the legal effect of the constitutional text”).
See Solum, supra note 33, at 459 (defining this as “Public Meaning Originalism,” the idea that “the
communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at the time of the origin by the
conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases in the context that was shared by the
drafters, ratifiers, and citizens.”).
See id. at 464 (defending the grouping of originalist strands together even though they may disagree
about how best to ground the theory).
See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 35, at 3 (arguing New Originalism diverges from Old Originalism
by separating “interpretation” from “construction”).
See Solum, supra note 33, at 457 (defining construction as “the activity that determines the content
of constitutional doctrine and the legal effect of the constitutional text”). It is not the purpose of
this Article to take issue with this activity being placed under the label of “construction,” but one
could make the case that, because the various ways of resolving under-determinacy in text are all
aimed at meaning-making, they are all more usefully termed “interpretation,” leaving only the
judicial doctrinal choices this Article engages for the “construction zone.” Later work will attempt
to tease out these distinctions further.
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future.44 All of this additional work has been described as existing in a
“construction zone”—a space where constitutional meaning either is underdetermined or is fully determined by text and/or precedent and must now
be applied to an actual case through a rule of decision.45
This latter, doctrinal-development dimension focuses more on the
judicial craft than on the meaning of legally authoritative texts, and it is the
subject of the inquiry this Article undertakes.46 That inquiry properly begins
with the assumptions underlying the preference for rules over standards in
doctrine development.
Neoformalists, most recently represented on the Court by Justice Antonin
Scalia,47 seem to concede the descriptive legal realist case that judging is often
influenced by factors beyond the facts of a case before a court and the
applicable law, but also seem to be very troubled by this fact.48 These
scholars and judges see value in a system of law that is as predictable and
uniform in its application as possible, and they see value in placing limits on
the discretion of judges to achieve these ends. Accordingly, they advocate
that articulating clear, inflexible legal rules in appellate courts that can simply
be applied in the lower courts has the best potential to minimize the effect of
extra-legal factors on judging.49 Simply put, if a judge has fewer (or no)
degrees of freedom in arriving at a decision, then there will be less (or no)
room for extra-legal factors to operate, resulting in greater predictability, at
least for those who take the time to educate themselves on the law. As applied
to constitutional law, we might term this judicial craftwork, neoformalist
constitutional construction.

44

45
46

47

48
49

Solum, supra note 6, at 208 (arguing that it is a “realist caricature of formalism” to see formalism as
treating all precedents as if they possessed the power to guide the Court without any need for reason
and judgment).
Solum, supra note 33, at 458.
In truth, developing categorical rules is one part of neoformalist constitutional construction, with
the others being more contested, and at times shading away from originalism and neoformalism
and toward living constitutionalism and legal realism. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 15, at 763–64
(pointing out that originalist construction, as a way of resolving under-determinacy in the text, can
shade into living constitutionalism); Redish & Arnould, supra note 15, at 1509–10 (same). For that
reason, only the “rules vs. standards” question is examined here under this label, though other
forms of construction certainly fit within its bounds.
See Scalia, supra note 8, at 1187 (“All I urge is that [standards-based] modes of analysis be avoided
where possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question
allows; and that, to foster a correct attitude toward the matter, we appellate judges bear in mind
that when we have finally reached the point where we can do no more than consult the totality of
the circumstances, we are acting more as fact-finders than as expositors of the law.”).
See id. at 1186–1187 (explaining how the law will always have need of balancing tests and totality of
the circumstances tests).
Id. at 1187.
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Legal realists, represented recently on the Court by, among others,50
Justice Stephen Breyer,51 see futility in attempting to reduce legal doctrine to
a system of easily applicable rules, and therefore usually52 favor an approach
to judicial lawmaking that relies on flexible standards that allow for the
consideration of unique facts and equities, or a balancing of interests. The
virtue of this approach, it is generally agreed, is that, as each case comes to
court, the judge is empowered to seek a result that is more fair and just, in
light of the unique facts of the case.
As Justice Breyer points out, developing bright-line rules can be helpful
to lower courts and litigants, but there will always be cases that fall on the
wrong side of a bright line, and judges should have the ability to seek just
results in such cases, considering not only the text, structure, and legislative
history of the law in light of the facts of the case, but also its purpose and its
likely socio-legal consequences.53 Justice Scalia’s response to this line of
argument forms the theoretical basis for neoformalist constitutional
construction.
B. “Law of Rules” Values
In his famous article defending the “rules” side of the rules-standards
debate, Justice Scalia set forth two primary goals, along with a preferred
method for achieving these goals.54 The goals of any constructive doctrine
development exercise, according to Justice Scalia, should be the fostering of
predictability in the law, such that legal actors may order their conduct to
avoid running afoul of legal standards; and fostering the uniform application
of the law in the lower courts, such that legal disputants will be able to
formulate expectations of how their cases will come out once litigated.55

50

51

52

53
54
55

See William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1087, 1092–93 (1989) (arguing that Justice Stevens holds a legal realist view on judicial
deliberation).
See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from the Supreme Court, 8 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 99 (2006) (“I believe that no single theory can provide answers to all of
the questions that come before us as judges. Perhaps I have reached this conclusion because, unlike
many judges, I am prepared to live with uncertainty and ambiguity. Critics do not like this
approach because they want a bright-line rule and the guidance that a bright-line rule provides.
While a bright-line rule often provides some guidance, when many cases come near the edges of
the bright-line rule it can provide little or no guidance at all.”).
The word “usually” is used here and in the discussion of Justice Scalia below because, as others
have pointed out, the Justices certainly do (or did, in the case of Justice Scalia) deviate from their
professed philosophies. See, e.g., William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1138–39 & 1139 n.37 (1992) (offering examples of
Justice Scalia’s diversions from his positions).
Id.
See generally Scalia, supra note 8.
Id. at 1178–79.
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The mechanism that Justice Scalia favored for fostering these two ideals
was the cabining of judicial discretion thorough the promulgation of
categorical rules of decision in the appellate courts wherever possible.56
Underlying this proposal, as outlined above, is the descriptive legal realist
assumption that judges, left with too many degrees of decisional freedom, will
decide cases based on extra-legal factors, or will misapply the law to achieve
their own preferred outcomes.57 But it should be obvious that also underlying
Justice Scalia’s preferred method for counteracting this behavior is the
descriptive legal formalist assumption that judges will follow and faithfully
apply a categorical rule once articulated.
In other words, the constructive strand of neoformalism depends on the
applicative strand—the cabining of judicial discretion that is vital to the
achievement of legal predictability and uniformity of application cannot
happen in a regime devoid of strong stare decisis norms, including both a
norm of following binding precedent from higher courts and a norm of
critically analyzing prior appellate decisions to determine just what is binding
in them, and what is dicta. Through the application of a strong distinction
between holding and dicta, the lower courts cabin their own discretion, and
they make possible the success of categorical rules. Absent this application,
a categorical rule becomes no more than a suggestion or a starting point for
judicial adventurism. Adherence in the lower courts to a strong distinction
between holding and dicta is therefore a necessary assumption grounding the
neoformalist values of fostering predictability and uniformity, which
themselves ground the neoformalist preference for rules over standards in
most cases. If that descriptive legal formalist assumption does not hold, then
neoformalist constitutional construction cannot succeed.
C. The Thorny Problem of Holding and Dicta
The requirement to adhere to controlling precedent is a foundational
aspect of the United States legal system, and one that distinguishes commonlaw systems such as those in the United States and England from civil law
systems, such as are prevalent in Continental Europe.58 Indeed, within forty56
57

58

Id. at 1187.
See id. at 1180 (“It is a commonplace that the one effective check upon arbitrary judges is criticism
by the bar and the academy. But it is no more possible to demonstrate the inconsistency of two
opinions based upon a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test than it is to demonstrate the inconsistency
of two jury verdicts. Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.”).
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1186
(2006) (“Reliance on precedent seems here to stay, as even its fiercest critics regretfully concede.”);
Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81 (2000) (arguing that at
least the consideration of precedent from a court at the same level as the deciding court is a
constitutional compulsion, and pointing out the distinction in approaches between common law
and civil law systems); Solum, supra note 6, at 156–57, 186–189 (2006) (distinguishing between the
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eight hours of the first law school class, a law student in a common law
jurisdiction likely understands the simple concept that lower courts must
apply the “holdings” set down by higher courts in cases embracing
appropriately similar facts, and may treat as merely persuasive the “dicta”
found in these opinions.
A good deal of research—some ancient, some very recent—focuses on
the surprising difficulty that both courts and scholars have in distinguishing
the holding of a case from its dicta.59 Although this literature is voluminous,
the competing accounts of how we should separate holding from dicta can
be usefully grouped into two schools of thought. One school, which I will
dub the traditionalist school, seeks ways of determining the holdings of prior
cases that grant little to no deference to the deciding judges in those cases,
particularly as to which facts were material to those judges’ decisions in the
cases.60 This school represents by far the most influential view of the
distinction, one which remains enshrined in the definitions of the terms
“judicial dictum” and “obiter dictum” in Black’s Law Dictionary.61
This approach is associated with the nineteenth century work of Professor
Wambaugh, who viewed a holding as the court’s decision or disposition, plus
all statements in the case “necessary” to the decision.62 Professor Wambaugh
operationalized his view through a simple “but-for” test: to determine
whether a judicial statement is part of the holding or is dicta, one should
simply ask whether, absent the statement in question, the decision could be

59

60

61

62

Supreme Court’s responsibilities relating to its own precedent, which it is free to overrule, and lower
courts’ responsibilities relating to the same precedent, which they are bound to follow, and arguing
that the Supreme Court’s should more strictly adhere to its own precedents).
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 959–60
(2005) (developing a new test for determining the actual holding of a case and applying the test to
several familiar constitutional law cases); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It
Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 220–21 (2010) (arguing that faulty attention to judicial
statements—what courts say—as opposed to actual holdings—what courts do, leads to the elevation
of dicta to binding precedent); see also Leval, supra note 24, at 1250 (“Although I think most agree
in the abstract with the proposition that dictum does not establish binding law, this rule is honored
in the breach with alarming frequency.”); Solum, supra note 6, at 186–89 (reviewing the realistformalist debates over the proper conception of a judicial holding).
The most comprehensive account of these various accounts is that of Abramowicz & Stearns, supra
note 59. Abramowicz and Stearns do not divide the schools of thought as I do, but their analysis
accounts for the same distinction, and their own proposed method does an admirable job of
attempting to bridge the differences between these competing accounts.
Judicial Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (“An opinion by a court on a question
that is directly involved, briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that
is not essential to the decision.”); Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (“A
judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (though it may be considered
persuasive).—Often shortened to dictum or, less commonly, obiter.”).
EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES § 13 (2d ed. 1894).
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the same.63 If so, the statement in question is dicta.
The principal problem with this approach is its inability to deal with
alternative justifications for the same outcome. Where such alternative
justifications exist, applying Wambaugh’s test would reveal that neither was
strictly necessary to the outcome. Accordingly, each would be viewed by
Wambaugh as dicta, leaving the case without any holdings.64 Another
problem is the fact that courts often do not resolve a case on the narrowest
grounds conceivable, so it will often be possible to whittle down a court’s
actual holding to a narrower one than the court intended through
speculation, and this possibility may leave later courts and academics, rather
than the deciding court, in control of the scope of the decision.65
Another non-deferential view, offered in response to Wambaugh’s and
more amenable to the alternative holdings problem, sought to arrive at a
sufficient post hoc factual and legal justification for the outcome of the case.66
Professor Dorf has argued that this approach sought to “reconcile” the
principles of law stated in the case with the facts of the case.67 Professors
Abramowicz and Stearns term this theory the “facts-plus-outcome”
approach or the “reconciliation” approach. This approach went beyond the
strictly “necessary” proposition to include within the holding all statements
that could be reconciled with the decision, in light of the facts of the case (or
in Dworkinian terms, the propositions which “fit and justify” it).68 Due to
the tendency of later courts to focus on particular facts that support a desired
rationale and to minimize the impact of facts that contradict it, this approach
drew criticisms based on indeterminacy. The main weakness of these nondeferential approaches was that, since they afforded little to no deference to
the deciding court in its determination of how broadly or narrowly to address
the facts of the case, they were therefore better potential constraints on the
deciding court than on later courts. A workable approach to holding and
63
64

65
66
67
68

Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1056 (explaining Wambaugh’s approach, and terming it
the “necessary” approach).
Id. at 1056–57 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).
A holding-dicta traditionalist would likely concede this point and say that the privilege of making
law judicially requires a court to choose among possible alternative justifications, but, given the
strong norm of avoidance of reversal among lower courts, this prescription would seem unrealistic.
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1045.
See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2020 (1994) (critiquing this
approach as overly constrained and unreflective of actual judicial practices).
See id. (critiquing this approach as overly constrained and unreflective of actual judicial practices).
But see Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 958 n. 11 (citing Professor Dorf’s recent article
critiquing this particular theory as the only “major law review article in the past fifty years
exclusively focused on offering a broad theoretical treatment of the distinction between holding and
dicta”); id. at 1050 (citing Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 29–33
(1989)) (likening the reconciliation approach to Dworkin’s “fit and justification” model of
constitutional interpretation)).
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dicta should constrain both.
Another school of thought has afforded more deference to the deciding
court in determining—through the reasoning of its opinion—just which of
the case’s facts were material to the decision and which were incidental to it
or distinguishable from it. The oldest approach within this school, associated
with Professor Goodhart, viewed the binding, precedential legal holding as
the material facts of the case, as chosen by the deciding judge, that were
associated with the outcome of the case.69 Thus, rather than deriving a
binding rule through a post hoc justification for the decision in light of all of
the facts of the case, Goodhart’s conception of a holding looked to the court’s
articulation of its rationale, read in light of the court’s articulation of the
material facts, to derive a binding, precedential rule.
However, recognizing that opinions may appear differently in different
case reporters, and that some opinions go unreported, Goodhart set up a test
for materiality in the form of a rebuttable presumption either for or against
materiality:
If the opinion does not distinguish between material and immaterial facts
then all the facts set forth in the opinion must be considered material with
the exception of those that on their face are immaterial. There is a
presumption against wide principles of law, and the smaller the number of
material facts in a case the wider will the principle be. Thus if a case like
Hambrook v. Stokes, in which a mother died owing to shock at seeing a motor
accident which threatened her child, is decided on the fact that a bystander
may recover for injury due to shock, we have a broad principle of law. If the
additional fact that the bystander was a mother is held to be material we
then get a narrow principle of law. Therefore, unless a fact is expressly or
impliedly held to be immaterial, it must be considered material.70

Using this presumption, Goodhart argued, would allow for a later court to
determine the materiality of the case facts, even where the deciding judge
had failed to do so explicitly. But Goodhart’s approach would always defer
to the deciding judge’s determination of materiality if offered, and the test
above was designed to direct later courts to view the prior case’s rule in as
69

70

Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 169 (1930). Although
Professor Goodhart used only the term “ratio decidendi” in his title, his discussion throughout the
article was focused in what we today would term the holding, due to later incorporation of the terms
into one concept). See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1048 (discussing the early distinction
between holding—the precise decision in the case—and ratio decidendi—“the generally applicable
rule of law upon which the opinion says the holding rested,” and pointing out that the distinction
has blurred (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW
SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14 (Paul Gewirtz, ed., Michael Ansaldi, trans., 1989))).
Goodhart, supra note 69, at 178 (footnotes omitted). For criticism of Goodhart’s theory, compare
A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 453 (1957) (critiquing Goodhart’s
approach as circular), and Julius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597,
605 (1959) (critiquing Goodhart’s approach as inherently indeterminate), with A.L. Goodhart, The
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 117, 117 (1959) (responding to these critiques).
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narrow terms as possible in the event of no designation of materiality in the
opinion.71 Thus, although broader than the more traditionalist, nondeferential approaches, Goodhart’s approach would nevertheless tend
toward a narrow view of the propositions of a prior case that could be
considered binding.
Two other approaches within this more deferential school—both offered
in much more recent times—seek to resolve both the alternative holdings
problem created by the traditionalist approaches and the obvious competing
problem of the blurring of lines between deciding cases and prospectively
legislating, a likely risk where later courts afford the deciding judge total
discretion in determining which facts before him were material to the
outcome. The first, from Professor Dorf, argues that the determination of
which propositions should be counted as part of the holding of a decided case
should proceed along lines similar to those followed in analyzing issue
preclusion.72 Key to this approach is the later court’s determination that the
prior court carefully considered the proposition in question, and that it was
treated by that court as essential to the disposition, not in the logical, but-for
sense, but in the sense of “the process by which the court decide[d] the case.”73
Along similar lines, Professors Abramowicz & Stearns developed another
test in the deferential school, attempting to capture the strengths of these
early approaches, while accounting for their weaknesses, and to give a more
defined and more easily applicable form and shape to sophisticated
deferential approaches such as Professor Dorf’s.74 Although the authors do
not give it a name, for purposes of quick reference here, I will refer to it as
the “decisional path” approach. Under the decisional path approach,
propositions count as part of the holding if they lie along the “decisional
path” of reasoning chosen by the court, and they “(1) are actually decided,
(2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment.”75
The first prong of the decisional path approach requires that a
proposition must have been actually decided in the case to be part of the
holding. This requirement ensures that mere errant statements in the
majority opinion are not mistaken for holdings.76 The second prong requires
that, even if a proposition is actually decided, its resolution must also be based
on the actual facts of the case. This requirement recognizes that legislativetype holdings77 making broad pronouncements and resolving issues of law
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Goodhart, supra note 69, at 178.
Dorf, supra note 67, at 1999.
Id. at 2045.
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 961–62, 1065.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1066.
See Solum, supra note 6, 186–89 (developing the idea of legislative holdings).
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not presented squarely in the case’s facts not be counted as part of the
holding.78
The third prong requires that any actually decided proposition based on
the facts of the case actually lead to the court’s ultimate decision resolving
the issues of the case before it, if the proposition is to be considered part of
the holding.79 This prong ensures that discussions of hypothetical
alternatives to the court’s judgment, as well as refutations of challenges
presented by dissenters based on assumptions of what the next case may
provide (discussions that Professor Dorf refers to as “asides”80), are not
misconstrued as the holding of the case.81
Underlying all of these prongs is the requirement that any proposition
must lie along the court’s “decisional path.” This overarching requirement
actually functions as a moderating force, rather than as a strict limitation, as
the other prongs do. The decisional path may include propositions that,
while not “necessary” to the court’s ultimate resolution of the case,
nevertheless led to it. Thus, the decisional path approach attempts to capture
the “carefully considered” propositions that are the target of Professor Dorf’s
preclusion-based approach, but with a more defined set of factors aimed at
easier and more consistent application.
We need not declare an ultimate winner in these ongoing debates for the
purposes of this Article. It suffices to recognize that each approach seeks to
hem in the holding of the case to that which addresses the material facts
before the court. Where they differ is in their tolerance for the deciding
court’s discretion in treating some facts as material or non-material in
arriving at its decision. The broadest, and most recent, approaches
presumptively grant near total deference to the deciding court, with the
limitation on that discretion being the court’s depth of consideration of the
propositions related to the facts the court treats as material.
We now move from defining the parameters of the analysis this Article
offers to its test case, Garcetti v. Ceballos. The following Part reviews Garcetti’s
origins and its content with an eye toward isolating its holding from its dicta.
Going forward, we can afford the neoformalist approach its most favored
posture by analyzing the performance of the Garcetti rule under what is
arguably the broadest and most deferential modern approach to holding and
dicta—the decisional path approach—understanding that the Garcetti rule
would be more difficult to defend on the neoformalist grounds of
predictability, uniformity, and the cabining of judicial discretion in the lower
courts under any of the stricter approaches.

78
79
80
81

Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1068.
Id. at 1066.
Dorf, supra note 67, at 2006.
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1065.
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
A. The Basic Doctrine
Under the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine,” the government may
not condition the provision of a public benefit—including public
employment—on the recipient’s relinquishment of a constitutional right.82
Nevertheless, courts have permitted the government, acting in its role as an
employer,83 to limit public employees’ speech rights that would otherwise be
protected in a non-employment setting.84 In most cases, these limitations
have focused on managerial interests.85 Until recently, such limitations have
largely emerged through case-by-case balancing pitting employee speech
interests (and the listening/reading interests of the public) against employer
managerial interests, rather than through categorical rules excluding certain
speech from protection in all cases.86
82

83

84

85

86

See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967) (holding that a public university
cannot condition employment as a professor on the professor’s signing of a “Loyalty Oath”);
Kathleen A. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415–16 (1989) (outlining
the state of the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine). But see Bauries & Schach supra note 20, at
359 (arguing that courts have too broadly applied the Garcetti rule, further curtailing public
employee speech rights); Secunda, supra note 21, at 908–10 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s line
of decisions in Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti have weakened the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
to the point of near obliteration).
It is also well-settled that the government does not always act in its traditional sovereign capacity,
and when it acts in some other role, such as the role of an employer, an arts patron, or a property
manager, the government can restrict speech in ways that serve the important governmental
interests incidental to these roles. See Scott R. Bauries, Individual Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern
of the First Amendment, 83 MISS. L.J. 677, 742 (2014) (explaining that the Supreme Court has never
recognized an individual’s absolute First Amendment right to academic freedom when balanced
against government interests).
See, e.g., Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[S]peech relating to tasks within an employee’s uncontested employment responsibilities is not
protected from regulation.”); Williams v. Dall. Ind. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007)
(dismissing high school football coach’s First Amendment claims regarding a memorandum he had
written concerning potential financial malfeasance on the part of school administrators, as the
memorandum was written in the course of his job performance); Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch.
Co., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming that a school district can decline to renew a
teacher’s contract for advocating her viewpoint on antiwar demonstrations in a classroom setting).
See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998) (“We agree with
Plato and Burke and Justice Frankfurter that the school, not the teacher, has the right to fix the
curriculum.”); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 39 (2008) (arguing that Garcetti is the latest in a series of Supreme Court
decisions elevating “managerial prerogative” to constitutional status).
One might categorize an element of the Pickering analysis—the requirement that a public employee’s
speech be made on a “matter of public concern”—as a categorical rule, but the bulk of the analysis
involves a balance between the speech interests of the employee and the managerial interests of the
employer. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (expressing skepticism about the public
concerns expressed by an assistant district attorney who was fired after distributing a questionnaire
regarding office morale, but ultimately resolving the case based on the managerial interests of the
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Pickering v. Board of Education,87 the leading case on public employee speech
rights, illustrates the standards-based approach. In Pickering, a local teacher
sent a letter to a newspaper criticizing the Board of Education’s prior
handling of previous proposals to increase the Board’s revenues, urging the
rejection of a pending bond issue.88 The Board terminated Mr. Pickering,
stating that his letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and
administration of the schools of the district.”89 On certiorari, the Court held
the termination unconstitutional, explaining that, absent substantial
justification, “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment.”90 To operationalize the “substantial justification” inquiry, the
Court balanced the interests of the Board as an employer and the interests of
Mr. Pickering as a participant in public debate, along with the interests of
the public—the consumers of the speech. The Court ultimately concluded
that the Board could state no interest sufficient to overcome the interest of
Mr. Pickering in participating as an ordinary citizen in an important public
debate, and the interests of the public in learning the thoughts of a teacher
within the system on an issue important to public education.91
Following Pickering, the Court entertained few public employee First
Amendment retaliation claims relevant to this discussion.92 However, one
significant case, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,93 further
clarified that neither the situs nor the target of the speech in question is
dispositive when determining whether the speech is protected. In Givhan, the
Court held that an employee’s internal complaints to her principal about
possible race discrimination in personnel decisions at her school site
constituted protected speech, and that the school’s managerial interests could
not override the plaintiff’s interests in weighing in on an important topic.94

87

88
89
90
91
92

93
94

employer).
391 U.S. 563 (1968). For a thoughtful summary of the pre-Garcetti jurisprudence, beginning with
Pickering, see generally Robert M. O’Neil, Academic Speech in the Post-Garcetti Environment, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2008).
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 572–74.
Id. at 574–75.
One major precedent, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983), held that while the plaintiff’s
speech did not have much public concern character to it, the employer’s interest in managing the
workplace outweighed whatever public and speaker interests did exist. Two other major
precedents, City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (following Connick) and Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (following Pickering), illustrated ways in which
the government could prevail in the balance, but they both continued the Pickering approach to
balancing.
439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 415–16.
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Thus, under the pre-Garcetti precedent, the fact that speech on a matter
of public concern is made while an employee is at work, to a superior, or
otherwise through internal channels, does not render the speech
unprotected. Garcetti reaffirmed and adopted this framework as the
foundation for its own ruling.
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos and Its Categorical Rule of Exclusion
1. The Garcetti Rule
Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s Office, at the request of defense counsel, reviewed for
accuracy an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant in a pending case.95
Ceballos concluded that there were unsatisfactory inaccuracies in the
affidavit, and concluded that the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant
should be suppressed. He relayed his findings to his superiors in the form of
a “disposition memorandum”—essentially, a legal memorandum outlining
the facts and his legal conclusions.96 His superiors decided to proceed with
the prosecution. Called to the stand in a motion to suppress hearing,
Ceballos testified for the defense concerning the affidavit, but the trial court
ultimately denied the motion.97 According to Ceballos, afterwards, he was
subjected to a variety of retaliatory employment actions, including
reassignment from his position and the denial of a promotion.98
Ceballos sued, asserting a violation of his First Amendment rights.99 On
appeal from summary judgment, the court of appeals applied the
Pickering/Connick test and found Ceballos’s memo—by then the only speech
at issue—to be “inherently a matter of public concern” because it “recited
what [Ceballos] thought to be governmental misconduct.”100 The Ninth
Circuit then proceeded to the interest-balancing portion of the
Pickering/Connick test and found that Ceballos’s interest in his speech
outweighed the government’s interests, noting that the government “‘failed
even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in the workings of the District
Attorney’s Office’ as a result of the memo.”101 In other words, the Ninth
Circuit analyzed the case as it would have analyzed any other—by balancing
the relevant interests.

95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id. at 416 (quoting Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Id. (quoting Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1180).
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When the Supreme Court reviewed the case, drawing from the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court explained that protecting
public employees’ rights to speak out on matters of public concern “limits the
ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to
restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their
capacities as private citizens.”102 The Court reaffirmed that the public’s
interest in receiving information about the functioning of government from
those most qualified to provide it is substantial.103 Nevertheless, the Court
also noted that public employers have a countervailing interest in policing
speech that, due to the employee’s role, may contain confidential
information, may be premature or factually incorrect, or may be damaging
to the employer’s standing in the community.104
Ordinarily, these claims would set the stage for a balancing of interests
that would ultimately leave the speech either protected or unprotected, but
in Garcetti, the Court took another path and instead adopted a new
categorical rule:105 “We hold that, when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.”106 The Court reasoned that,
since Ceballos “wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he,
as a calendar deputy, was employed to do,” he was not speaking as a
citizen.107 In essence, the speech in question—Ceballos’s disposition memo,
was Ceballos’s work product as a government employee, not his own speech,
and was therefore unprotected.
2. Garcetti’s Holding
Despite the diversity among the approaches to holding and dicta
reviewed above,108 each modern approach focuses in one way or another on
102
103
104

105

106
107
108

Id. at 419.
Id. at 419–20.
Id. at 422–23; see also Robert C. Cloud, Public Employee Speech on Matters Pursuant to Their Official Duties:
Whistle While You Work?, 210 EDUC. L. REP. 855, 857–58 (2006) (discussing the rights and authority
employers have to limit speech in certain circumstances).
Professor Sheldon Nahmod has referred to this ex ante version of balancing of interests, done in
pursuit of the development of a generally applicable categorical rule, as “categorical balancing.”
Nahmod, supra note 22, at 569–70 (“What the Court does when it balances categorically is weigh
what it considers to be the relevant interests, social and individual, at a fairly high level of generality,
and then by balancing those interests, arrive at a generally applicable rule to be applied in later
cases without further balancing.” (footnote omitted) (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 977, 979, 981 (1987)).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
Id.
This body of scholarship on the holding-dicta distinction continues to grow. See, e.g., Shawn J.
Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125, 126–27 (2009) (arguing for broader
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two elements: (1) the facts of the prior case decided, and (2) the court’s
pronouncements of its decision, along with the court’s selection of which facts
to emphasize in making its way to the holding.109 Under the decisional path
approach—arguably the most deferential approaches to the deciding court,
and thus, one more likely than the others to yield a more capacious holding—
the court lays out a “decisional path” consisting of factual and legal
propositions that ultimately make up the ratio decidendi of the case, and as
long as those propositions are actually considered and decided, they are part
of the holding.110
In Garcetti, the facts the Court considered included stipulations that (1) the
memorandum that Mr. Ceballos drafted recommending dismissal of the case
was the only speech at issue, and (2) Mr. Ceballos drafted the memorandum
pursuant to an official duty to draft legal memoranda.111 Following a
recitation of these facts, the Court reviewed both Pickering and Givhan to
support the propositions that it was immaterial that Mr. Ceballos spoke at
work to his superiors (as Givhan did), and that it was immaterial that Ceballos
spoke about matters related to his job (as both Pickering and Givhan did).112
Following this review, the Court distinguished Ceballos from these two
plaintiffs on the basis that neither Pickering nor Givhan were hired to make
the speech that led to their discipline.113 Then, the Court clearly stated its
ultimate rule: “We hold that, when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.”114
According to the Court, “The controlling factor in Ceballos’ case is that
his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”115
The Court cited this factor—that the memorandum was drafted as a

109
110
111
112
113
114

115

categories of interpretation of case law than more formalistic distinctions like holding and dicta);
Leval, supra note 24, at 1269 (arguing that lower courts afford dicta more weight than the Court
realizes); Stinson, supra note 59, at 220 (arguing that closer attention must be paid to the holdingdicta distinction in interpreting judicial opinions). All these articles were published after
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1065 (discussing the effects of the decisional path
approach).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“Ceballos wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he, as
a calendar deputy, was employed to do.”).
Id. at 420–21 (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1967)).
Id.
Id. at 421. Professor Solum has rightly admonished readers of legal opinions to be wary of judicial
statements that begin with “We hold that . . .,” as they are usually indicative of judicial overreach
into legislative territory, Solum, supra note 6, at 188, but in this case, the Court’s statement was in
fact its resolution of the sole issue in the case as presented.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
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requirement of Ceballos’s job—as the factor “distinguish[ing] Ceballos’ case
from those in which the First Amendment provides protection against
discipline.”116 Thus, a simple and faithful reading of the case would see the
binding rule emerging from it as creating a categorical exemption from First
Amendment protection for speech made “pursuant to official duties”;117 in
other words, for speech that is an employee’s work product.118 Through the
establishment of a categorical rule of decision where a more flexible standard
both preexisted and would likely (but not certainly) have led to the same
result in the case before the Court, the Court ostensibly made the
adjudication of public employee speech matters less subject to the discretion
of lower court judges and juries.
As the scholarship on precedent teaches, Justice Kennedy’s repeated use
of the phrase “pursuant to official duties” and its variants must be read in
light of the facts before the Court.119 As outlined above, the two most
relevant facts in the Garcetti case, according to the Court, were that (1) Mr.
Ceballos’s memorandum was the only speech at issue; and (2) Mr. Ceballos
drafted the memorandum as a requirement of his job. When the Court
stated, “We hold that, when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline,”120 the Court did so in the
context of these stipulated facts. The Court made this clear by preceding the
statement of its holding with the limiting justification, “The controlling factor
in Ceballos’ case is that his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a
calendar deputy.”121 Finally, citing both Pickering and Givhan as authority, the
Court also made it clear that its stated holding was not to be construed to bar
First Amendment protection for statements merely related to work, or for
statements made while at work, or for statements made only to coworkers or

116
117

118
119

120
121

Id.
It is true that the mere utterance of “We hold that” before a statement is insufficient to convert it
from dicta to holding. Leval, supra note 24, at 1257–58. Nevertheless, reading the binding rule in
Garcetti as such is only bolstered by the fact that the Court preceded its “pursuant to official duties”
statement with “We hold that . . .” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (using the term “work product” to describe Ceballos’s memorandum).
Such an approach would be entirely consistent with the dominant approaches to distinguishing
between holding and dicta, each of which requires that a proposition be linked to the facts before
the court at the time it rendered its decision in order to be considered part of the binding holding
of the case. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1045–65 (reviewing the dominant
approaches); Bayern, supra note 108, at 167–73 (2009) (proposing a new approach based on judicial
intent, but limiting any expressions of intent to those within the facts of the case).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (“Ceballos drafted his memorandum because that is what he was
employed to do.”).
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superiors.122 Thus, any reading of the case to bar protection for speech
“related to” or “in the course of” employment would be directly foreclosed
by the Court’s statements of what it was not holding, both of which
immediately preceded the “We hold that . . .” statement.123
With the above discussion in mind, the Court’s use of the phrase, “speaks
pursuant to his official duties” to delineate the category of unprotected
speech it recognized amounted to a public employee’s written or verbal work
product—nothing more. The Court took great pains to distinguish Mr.
Ceballos from Mr. Pickering, who spoke about his workplace, relating matters of
which his employment gave him unique knowledge, and who identified himself as a teacher
in doing so, and Ms. Givhan, who spoke about her workplace, while at work,
relating matters about which she learned by virtue of her employment, and who spoke
only internally to her supervisors.124 The simple fact distinguishing Mr. Ceballos
from these other two defendants is that neither Mr. Pickering’s nor Ms.
Givhan’s speech amounted to their work product.125
This interpretation makes considerable sense. Public employees should
not be able to claim that the work product they produce for their public
employers constitutes their own personal speech. Were this so, then as Justice
Kennedy pointed out, we would be faced with the familiar problem of
“constitutionalizing the employee grievance.”126 Barring First Amendment
protection for a public employee’s work product accordingly fits within the
general landscape of policies underlying the protection of most public
employee speech.127 And because work product is an easily defined category
of expression for most employees, it also makes sense to set that speech aside
categorically as unprotected, rather than to do so case-by-case.

122

123

124
125

126
127

Id. at 419, 421 (citing and reaffirming Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist. 439 U.S. 410, 414
(1979) (standing for the proposition that speech made while at work, even if made only internally
to supervisors or coworkers, remains subject to First Amendment protection) and Pickering v. Bd.
of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1967) (standing for the proposition that speech made relating to work,
remains subject to First Amendment protection)).
See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415–16 (upholding First Amendment protection for a public school employee
who complained of race discrimination in school personnel decisions while at work, and stated her
complaints only internally to her supervisors).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421; Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415–16.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“Ceballos wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he, as
a calendar deputy, was employed to do.”). Another way of saying this is that drafting the
memorandum is what he contracted with his employer to do. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN
LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW 35–36 (2008) (discussing the employment relationship as a
contractual relationship with duties on each side of the bargain).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 155 (declining to protect the
plaintiff’s speech in part because it mostly stated a private employee grievance).
See Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 631, 645–48 (2012) (discussing the lines drawn by different courts on whether a public
employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment).
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3. Garcetti’s Errata and the Phenomenon of Over-Justification
Illustrating a more recent phenomenon in Supreme Court judicial craft,
Justice Kennedy thoroughly justified his majority’s decision, making
numerous arguments against both the dissenters and the respondents in an
effort to support and insulate the Garcetti holding and its categorical rule. For
example, in addressing the respondent’s brief, Justice Kennedy rejected
“Ceballos’s proposed contrary rule” (i.e., the application of the Pickering test),
on the basis that it would mandate ongoing and intrusive “judicial oversight
of communications between and among government employees and their
superiors in the course of official business.”128 Several courts have picked up
on the use of the employment law term of art “in the course of”129 and
concluded that any communication uttered while working is exempt from
First Amendment protection.130 Justice Kennedy repeated this dictum in
another form while defending the scope of the Court’s actual holding against
the contrary view of the Ninth Circuit majority.131
One factor motivating the court of appeals to apply the Pickering test was
a “perceived anomaly” in First Amendment jurisprudence that would
otherwise have resulted—that an employee’s statement on a matter of public
concern at work would be unprotected, but the same employee’s identical
public statement outside of work would arguably qualify for protection.132 In
answering this concern, Justice Kennedy stated that the Pickering test still
applies to employees speaking “outside the course of performing their official
duties.”133 By negative implication, this choice of phrasing once again called
up the familiar, and much broader, term of art associated with workers’
compensation, rather than the Court’s much narrower, “pursuant to”
holding.134
Finally (as to the majority’s dicta), and most troublingly, in emphasizing
the rule that public employees may not claim First Amendment protection
to speech that amounts to their own job duties, the Court stated: “Restricting
speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities
128
129

130
131

132
133
134

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
This term calls up, for example, the definition of a compensable injury found in many state workers’
compensation statutes. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301(1) (2011) (“An employee, who receives
a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to
this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act.”).
E.g. Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (“Employees who make public statements outside the course of performing
their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind
of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.” (emphasis added)).
See id. at 423–24 (addressing the “perceived . . . anomaly”).
Id. at 423.
See also id. at 426 (“Our precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of action
behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.”).
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does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created.”135 Characterizing what the
Court, in the immediately preceding paragraph, had carefully described and
cabined as the job-required speech of the employee as instead any speech
that “owes its existence” to the employee’s employment sounds like a “butfor” test. If any speech that “owes its existence” to a government employee’s
employment is speech “pursuant to” that employee’s “official duties,” then
any speech that the employee makes at work, that relates to the employee’s
job in any way, that the employee repeats from what he heard at work, or
that the employee makes based on information he learned at work, all
qualifies as speech made “pursuant to official duties.” This formulation
would have abrogated Pickering.
Illustrating the problems inherent in over-justification, the dissenters
largely focused on these statements, often to the exclusion of the holding, to
make their points. Justice Stevens, for example, authored a brief dissent. In it,
he criticized the “categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and
speaking in the course of one’s employment” as “quite wrong.”136 As authority
for his argument, Justice Stevens cited Givhan, which the majority took pains to
reaffirm in its own opinion. Importantly, both the majority and the Stevens
dissent cited Givhan for the identical proposition that an employee does not lose
First Amendment protection merely by speaking at work, even internally, and
even on a matter related to work, such as race discrimination in the employer’s
practices.137 This cross-citation of the same case for the same proposition
indicates that the majority and Justice Stevens were talking past one another,
but Justice Stevens’s failure to recognize that the majority’s decision made no
change to Givhan (indeed explicitly reaffirming it), coupled with his use of the
“course of employment” language found in Justice Kennedy’s dicta, provided
fodder for later courts’ confused applications of the rule.
Justice Souter’s lengthy dissent, joined in full by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, gave significant attention to the holding, contending that the
majority’s categorical rule leaves much room for judicial mischief through its
failure to articulate a test for whether speech is “pursuant to” one’s
employment duties.138
Justice Souter proposed his own preferred rule for the case, that an
employer’s “substantial interests in effectuating its chosen policy and
objectives” can be outweighed by “private and public interests in addressing

135
136
137
138

Id. at 421–22 (emphasis added).
Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 420–21 (majority opinion); id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 428–44 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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official wrongdoing and threats to health and safety,” and when they are,
“public employees who speak on these matters in the course of their duties should
be eligible to claim First Amendment protection.”139 Justice Souter’s
preferred rule, if adopted, would actually shrink some of the Pickering
protection left undisturbed by the majority’s holding. If read literally, it
would place a public employee’s expression made “in the course of duties”
outside the protection of the First Amendment unless it addresses “a matter
of unusual importance and satisfies high standards of responsibility.”140
Based on Justice Souter’s articulation of an alternative rule, then, one
must conclude that either (1) Justice Souter misapprehended the scope of the
majority’s categorical rule, which limited its exemption to expression made
“pursuant to” one’s job duties; or (2) Justice Souter (and those joining his
dissent) would prefer a much broader First Amendment exemption for
expression made “in the course of duties,” with a limited exception for speech
addressing matters of “unusual” public importance.141 Thus, both the
majority and Justice Souter’s dissent favored categorical exemptions from
First Amendment protection for public employee speech, but possibly due to
their inordinate focus on dicta to the exclusion of holding, or possibly due to
an increased concern for what Professor Rosenthal has termed “managerial
prerogative” 142 in all but the most important cases, the dissenters would
propose a much broader exemption.143
Justice Breyer declined to join Justice Souter’s dissent along with the
other three dissenters, writing for himself.144 From his first statement of the
issue before the Court, Justice Breyer perpetuated the elevation of the “in the
course” dictum first uttered in the majority opinion, framing the issue as the
protection owed to speech that “takes place in the ordinary course of
performing the duties of a government job.”145 Interestingly, though, Justice
Breyer also proposed a categorical rule, and one that read as even broader
than the one proposed by the other dissenters, which itself was broader than
the majority’s rule.
139
140
141
142
143

144
145

Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
Id. at 435.
See also id. at 437 (“[The majority’s cited case] is no authority for the notion that government may
exercise plenary control over every comment made by a public employee in doing his job.”).
See generally Rosenthal, supra note 85 (referring to managerial prerogatives that ensure political
officials are held politically accountable for the operations of their public offices).
The dissenters largely are the subject of sympathetic commentary in the scholarly studies of Garcetti.
No such commentary, to my knowledge, has acknowledged either (1) that the dissenters themselves
propose a categorical rule, or (2) that the rule they propose seems to sweep far expression within its
scope (at least in cases where the narrow exception does not apply) than the rule adopted by the
majority.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 444–50 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (writing separately to explain his difference
in opinion from both the majority opinion and Justice Souter’s dissent).
Id. at 444.
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Under Justice Breyer’s rule, which incorporated the “in the course”
language, public employee speech that occurs “in the course of ordinary jobrelated duties” qualifies for First Amendment protection if it addresses a
matter of public concern, but “only in the presence of an augmented need
for constitutional protection and diminished risk of undue judicial
interference with governmental management of the public’s affairs.”146 Like
the rule proposed by the other three dissenters, Justice Breyer’s proposed rule
did not contain any requirement that the speech in question be mandated by
the job in question—only that the speech in question “takes place” while a
public employee is performing his or her “ordinary job duties.”147 Under
this formulation, as under the formulation proposed by the other dissenters,
an employee may have a job that does not require any speech at all, yet may
still be denied the protection of the First Amendment if the employee simply
speaks while working, and neither the Constitution nor state-created
professional obligations places any special duty to speak in the public interest
on that employee.148
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION RULES AND JUDICIAL CRAFT
A. The Elevation of Errata in the Lower Courts
Like neoformalist constitutional construction itself, Garcetti’s rule is
grounded in a preference for predictability and uniformity in the law and the
cabining of judicial discretion.149 It is therefore founded on the empirical

146
147
148

149

Id. at 449–50 (affording constitutional protection for speech that occurs during the course of a
governmental employee’s job and involves a matter of public concern).
Id. (failing to mention a requirement for mandated employee speech).
See id. at 445 (listing what Justice Breyer believes is common ground). Although neither Justice
Souter nor Justice Breyer claims that his rule is categorical, their use of absolutist terms such as
“unless,” id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting), and “only,” id. at 445 (Breyer, J., dissenting), compels
this conclusion. Perhaps if either were in the majority, he would have proposed a less restrictive
rule, but the willingness of each to base a substantial portion of his opinion, as well as his proposed
alternative rule, on the “in the course” dictum of the majority opinion, rather than on the narrower
“pursuant to” exemption, suggests otherwise.
See id. at 423 (majority opinion) (“Ceballos’ proposed contrary rule, adopted by the Court of
Appeals, would commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating
judicial oversight of communications between and among government employees and their
superiors in the course of official business. This displacement of managerial discretion by judicial
supervision finds no support in our precedents. When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing
a matter of public concern, the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing
interests surrounding the speech and its consequences. When, however, the employee is simply
performing his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of scrutiny. To hold
otherwise would be to demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental
operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation of
powers.”); Rhodes, supra note 21, at 1194 (stating Garcetti’s rule superficially promotes
predictability).
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assumption that lower courts will faithfully apply categorical rules of decision
once these decision rules are established.150 In effect, all categorical rules
assume the adherence of the lower courts to a strict version of stare decisis.
Without this assumption, the theoretical justifications for preferring
categorical rules over standards collapse.
However, a survey of the lower court cases applying Garcetti reveals that
this assumption was misplaced. In case after case, the lower courts have read
Garcetti to exclude far more speech from the First Amendment’s protection
than the Court obviously meant to exclude. The tool they have used to
accomplish this expansion of the exclusionary holding is, in most cases, the
dicta and other errata scattered throughout the majority and dissents in the
case. Below, I outline the general trends in the use of these phrases, leading
to a discussion of the Court’s most recent consideration of the issue in Lane v.
Franks,151 through which the Court supplied the lower courts with a useful,
but far too circumspect, corrective. The discussion below takes the two most
quoted errata and shows how the lower courts have used them to reach
results contrary to what neoformalist would expect (or hope) to see.
1. The “Course of Performing” Dictum
Beginning with what I will term the “course of performing” dictum, the
Court in Garcetti, after setting forth its categorical exclusion of speech made
“pursuant to official duties” from the First Amendment’s protection,
proceeded to defend that rule against counter-arguments offered by the
dissents and the appellee, Ceballos.
The Court introduced the “course of performing” dictum in framing the
appellee’s argument: “Ceballos’ proposed contrary rule, adopted by the
Court of Appeals, would commit state and federal courts to a new,
permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of
communications between and among government employees and their
superiors in the course of official business.”152 The Court continued, framing the
lower court’s error in applying the Pickering test in the following way:
The Court of Appeals based its holding in part on what it perceived as a
doctrinal anomaly. The court suggested it would be inconsistent to compel
public employers to tolerate certain employee speech made publicly but not
speech made pursuant to an employee’s assigned duties. This objection
misconceives the theoretical underpinnings of our decisions. Employees who
make public statements outside the course of performing their official duties retain
some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of
150
151
152

See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 8, at 1176–77 (implying this assumption in distinguishing between
judicially crafted rules and standards).
134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (emphasis added).
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activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government. The
same goes for writing a letter to a local newspaper, or discussing politics with
a co-worker. When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment
responsibilities, however, there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens
who are not government employees.153

Reading the language quoted might lead one to conclude that the Court was
expressing the grounds for a negative inference—by saying that employees
speaking “outside the course of performing their official duties” may retain
First Amendment protection, perhaps the Court was implying that any
employee speaking while within the course of performing official duties
cannot access such protection.
But this interpretation would place the Garcetti rule directly at odds with
Givhan, cited approvingly by the Garcetti Court, which approved First
Amendment protection for speech made while the speaker was at work, and
only to her supervisor, not to mention Rankin v. McPherson,154 which approved
protection for employees talking politics while working. Further, this
interpretation would contradict the last sentence of the passage above, which
clearly defines the speech excluded as that which is “pursuant to employment
responsibilities,” and which has no relevant citizen-speech analogue. Finally,
it would contradict the carefully circumscribed holding of the case, as outlined
above. It would be odd to think that the Court would deliberately set forth a
circumscribed holding, even using the words, “We hold that” to introduce it,
and then set forth a directly contrary one only a few paragraphs later.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, adopted this
interpretation. He framed the basis for his dissent in the terms of the quote
above, rather than in the terms of the Court’s holding, stating, “The notion
that there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking
in the course of one’s employment is quite wrong.”155 Justice Souter’s dissent also
adopted this framing, in stating its alternative preferred holding, “[A]n
employee commenting on subjects in the course of duties should not prevail on
balance unless he speaks on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies high
standards of responsibility in the way he does it.”156
Also, Justice Breyer, in dissent, adopted this mistaken interpretation. He
framed the issues in the case as, “whether the First Amendment protects
public employees when they engage in speech that both (1) involves matters
of public concern and (2) takes place in the ordinary course of performing the duties

153

154
155
156

Id. at 423–24 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (citing Cabellos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d
1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004); then citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); and then
citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)).
483 U.S. 378, 390–92 (1987).
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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of a government job.”157 He reiterated this misconception in stating his
preferred alternative holding:
I conclude that the First Amendment sometimes does authorize judicial
actions based upon a government employee’s speech that both (1) involves a
matter of public concern and also (2) takes place in the course of ordinary job-related
duties. But it does so only in the presence of augmented need for
constitutional protection and diminished risk of undue judicial interference
with governmental management of the public’s affairs.158

Thus, not only the dicta in the majority opinion, but also the errata in dissent,
supplied ammunition for courts seeking to expand the boundaries of Garcetti’s
exclusion.
Considering the above, it is little wonder that the “course of performing”
erratum has been a popular one with lower courts, and that its application
almost always leads to the employee-plaintiff’s loss, where a “pursuant to
official duties” rule would have left open the possibility of protection. In
Williams v. Dallas Independent School District,159 for example, the Fifth Circuit
denied First Amendment protection to a high school athletic director who
was terminated allegedly in retaliation for writing a memorandum to the
school administration questioning the use of athletic funds.160
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the speech in question was not
speech required of an athletic director, but framed its task in the case as one to
“determine the extent to which, under Garcetti, a public employee is protected
by the First Amendment if his speech is not necessarily required by his job
duties but nevertheless is related to his job duties.”161 Citing the majority
opinion, the Williams court stated the very broad proposition, neither held
nor even stated in Garcetti, that “Activities undertaken in the course of
performing one’s job are activities pursuant to official duties.”162 The Fifth
Circuit’s opinion ends with the statement, “We thus hold that Williams’s
memoranda to the office manager and principal Wright were written in the
course of performing his job as Athletic Director; thus, the speech contained
therein is not protected by the First Amendment.”163
Although the circuits have not interpreted the decision uniformly, and
some circuits have faithfully read the holding as a narrow First Amendment
exception keyed to a public employee’s work product,164 other federal
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 444 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 449–50 (emphasis added).
480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Id. at 690–91. The memorandum also included veiled charges of internal corruption, citing a
“network of friends and house rules.” Id. at 691.
Id. at 693.
Id. (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).
Id. at 694.
See, e.g., Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that much of plaintiff’s speech
made while working was protected because it was not required as part of her job duties but
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appellate decisions have made mistakes similar to that of the Fifth Circuit.
For example, in Weintraub v. Board of Education,165 the Second Circuit denied
First Amendment protection to a teacher who had allegedly been retaliated
against for filing a union grievance. The court cited the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Williams and concluded that the teacher’s “speech challenging the
school administration’s decision to not discipline a student in his class” was
“‘undertaken in the course of performing,’ his primary employment
responsibility of teaching.”166
Similarly, in Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy,167 the Tenth
Circuit denied First Amendment protection to teachers at a public charter
school, who had expressed concerns over “the Academy’s expectations
regarding student behavior,”168 “the Academy’s curriculum and
pedagogy,”169 and “money [spent] on instructional aids, furniture, and
classroom computers.”170 The court evaluated each of these categories of
speech and concluded that, because each related to the job requirements of
the teachers and was uttered through a grievance at work, the speech was
made “pursuant to” duties.171 To set these conclusions up, the court, like the
Fifth Circuit in Williams, conflated the Garcetti “in the course” dictum with
the “pursuant to” term in the Court’s holding, concluding that “if an
employee engages in speech during the course of performing an official duty and
the speech reasonably contributes to or facilitates the employee’s
performance of the official duty, the speech is made pursuant to the
employee’s official duties.”172
2. The “Owes Its Existence” Dictum
The Court introduced the “owes its existence” dictum in seeking to justify
the rule it had laid down only a few paragraphs before that public employees
do not receive the protection of the First Amendment for speech they make
pursuant to their official duties. The justification sought to show that the
speech excluded merely constituted the public employee’s work product, and
therefore it was immaterial whether the employee himself also had some
personal expressive interest in making it. But Justice Kennedy chose to

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

remanding for a determination of the extent of the jury’s reliance on paperwork completed in relation
to harassment complaints, where the filling out of such paperwork was one of plaintiff’s job duties).
593 F.3d 196, 205 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 203 (quoting Williams, 480 F.3d at 693).
492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1204 (providing an example of a matters discussed pursuant to the plaintiffs’ duties as
teachers).
Id. (identifying subject matter that the plaintiff discussed).
Id. (detailing the plaintiff’s complaint about the Academy).
Id. (concluding that expressing complaints about some tasks was done “pursuant to” duties).
Id. at 1203.
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articulate this justification in terms that obfuscated the rule it sought to
justify:
The significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to Ceballos’
official duties. Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might
have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.173

Obviously, even a conservative reading of the phrase “speech that owes its
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities” has the
potential to sweep within the Court’s exclusion speech that, for example,
merely reveals an employee’s knowledge of his work or work environment,
as Pickering’s speech did. But the Court made clear multiple times that it
was not taking speech such as Pickering’s out of the protection of the First
Amendment. A reading of the entire quoted section above reveals that the
Court here was attempting to distinguish a public employee’s verbal and
written work product from other speech the employee might make, whether
at work or elsewhere. But a reading of the emphasized phrase without this
context allows for a much broader exclusion.
The “owes its existence” dictum has found its way into several lower court
opinions applying Garcetti, so much so that it has been the only erratum to
date that has led to a corrective ruling by the Supreme Court, discussed
below. Two examples will illustrate its use.174 In Fox v. Traverse City Area Public
Schools Board of Education,175 a teacher was disciplined for complaining to her
supervisors that, as a special education pull-out teacher, she was required to
supervise more students than the maximum allowed under applicable law.176
No party to the case contended that Ms. Fox’s job duties required her to
make such complaints, or to monitor the number of students she was
173
174

175
176

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006) (emphasis added).
To be sure, several circuit court majorities pushed back against this trend, and several other circuit
court dissenters have pointed out how unwise it is to read the Supreme Court’s exclusion more
broadly than the facts of the Garcetti case would permit. Most notably, a majority in the Third
Circuit recently, in no uncertain terms, rejected the efforts of a school district to elevate the “owes
its existence” dictum to a holding, stating:
These arguments ask us to read Garcetti far too broadly. This Court has never applied
the “owes its existence to” test that Appellants wish to advance, and for good reason: this
nearly all-inclusive standard would eviscerate citizen speech by public employees simply
because they learned the information in the course of their employment, which is at odds
with the delicate balancing and policy rationales underlying Garcetti.
Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 989 (3d Cir. 2014). The existence of this decision
and a small number of others is encouraging, but their existence does not detract for my central
point, which is that, unless all, or at least most, lower court judges are as disciplined as this Third
Circuit panel, a categorical rule promulgated by the Supreme Court is likely to be of little use in
simplifying decisions, fostering predictability, and cabining judicial discretion, and may in fact do
more harm than good.
605 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 347.
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required to supervise for compliance with the law. Nevertheless, the Sixth
Circuit held that, because “her complaint about class size ‘owe[d] its
existence to’ her responsibilities as a special education teacher,” her speech
was unprotected.177
A recent Ninth Circuit case illustrates the mischief of this particular
dictum in allowing courts to equate any public employee speech “ow[ing] its
existence to” the employee’s official duties with “government speech,”178
which is thought to be exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.179 In Johnson
v. Poway Unified School Dist., a teacher, dissatisfied with what he viewed as his
colleagues’ promotion of various Eastern religious traditions on their
classroom bulletin boards,180 decided to place symbols of Christianity on his
own classroom’s bulletin board. The school’s policy was to allow teachers to
decorate their own bulletin boards at their discretion, subject to the ultimate
control of the school principal. The teacher sued for violation of his First
Amendment speech and religious rights after being disciplined for hanging
the Christian symbols. Ultimately, the case was disposed of under the
Religion Clauses, but as to Mr. Johnson’s speech claim, the court held simply
that the speech on his classroom bulletin boards, because it “owed its
existence to his official job duties,” was “government speech,” citing the
“owes its existence” dictum.181
177
178

179

180

181

Id. at 349 (quoting Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 544 (6th Cir. 2007)).
See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a teacher’s
discretionary use of his classroom bulletin boards was the “government speech” of the district and
not the personal speech of the teacher). To be sure, other cases have mentioned the Garcetti
majority’s citation to Rosenberger v. Rectors of the University of Virginia, and have represented it as the
Court’s holding, but none of these cases justified the disposition on a government speech rationale.
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (“[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a
particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rectors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))); Whitfield v. Chartiers Valley Sch. Dist., 707 F. Supp.
2d 561, 576 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (mentioning the Garcetti majority’s citation to Rosenberger); Doucette v.
Minocqua, Hazelhurst & Lake Tomahawk Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 07-cv-292-bbc, 2008 WL
2412988, at *5 (W.D. Wis. June 12, 2008) (“Thus, the Court appears to be saying that when a
public employee speaks pursuant to her job duties, she is in essence speaking on behalf of the
government and the government should have complete authority over its own speech.”); see also
W.V. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 299 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citing Garcetti, 427 U.S. at 421–23) (claiming Garcetti held “that speech made by [a] government
employee pursuant to official duties is government speech” in a non-employment-related traditional
government speech case).
See generally Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 587 (2008) (discussing how protection of free expression is contingent on the source of the
expression).
The display most prominently featured in the court’s opinion was that of several Tibetan prayer
flags. See Johnson, 658 F.3d at 973 (distinguishing the Tibetan flags that were displayed without
religious intent from intentionally Christian displays).
Id. at 970 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22). The Garcetti majority’s government speech dictum,
in which it referenced the principles of the government speech doctrine and cited Rosenberger, but
did not hold that public employee speech is government speech, has not featured prominently in
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B. Lane v. Franks: A Useful, but Limited, Corrective
The Roberts Court considered its second public employee speech case in
October Term 2013. Lane v. Franks presented the First Amendment claims
of Edward Lane, an Alabama public community college employee who was
hired to manage a community outreach and education program with several
employees. As one of his early tasks on the job, Lane audited the payroll and
work records of all of his employees and discovered that, based on these
records, Suzanne Schmitz, a then-sitting member of the Alabama
Legislature, had been receiving a salary from the program but doing little to
no work in exchange for it.182
Lane held a meeting with Schmitz at which he demanded that she begin
doing work that would justify the salary, but she refused, so he terminated
her employment.183 Upon learning of her termination Schmitz threatened
retaliation against Lane.184 Eventually, the Department of Justice learned of
Schmitz’s no-show job, and because the program was funded in part
federally, prosecuted her for fraud.185 Lane was called as a witness during
the trial, and he testified truthfully as to the facts set forth above. Following
Lane’s testimony, the program’s entire twenty-nine-person workforce was
laid off, with all but Lane and one other former employee being rehired.186
Lane sued the college’s president, who ordered the layoffs and selective
rehirings, asserting, among other claims, a claim that his First Amendment
rights had been violated. His argument was that his testimony in Schmitz’s
trial was speech protected by the First Amendment, and that the college’s
president had impermissibly retaliated against him for this protected
speech.187
The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court after the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment against Lane.188 The court of appeals based its decision
substantially on Garcetti, along with some pre-Garcetti precedent that the court
viewed as consistent with Garcetti.189 Under the court’s reading of Garcetti,
which employed the “owed its existence” dictum of Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion as a holding, the court held that, since Lane had only

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

the appellate cases applying Garcetti, but it stands as yet another example of errant language that
appellate courts, such as the Johnson court, can use to limit rights beyond Garcetti’s narrow exclusion.
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2376.
Id.
Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 Fed. App’x. 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Id. at 711–12 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006)).
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learned about Schmitz’s no-show job by virtue of his employment as head of
the program, his testimony “owed its existence to [Lane’s] professional
responsibilities,” and was therefore unprotected under Garcetti.190
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals. Holding
that the Garcetti decision removed from the protection of the First
Amendment only from speech the employee was required to make as part of
a job duty, the Court easily concluded that offering testimony in a criminal
case did not meet this test for Lane.191 He was not employed to testify in
criminal trials, nor did his job duties even suggest that his employer would
ever ask him to do so. Though Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito joined a
separate concurrence to further clarify what the Court was not holding, all
nine Justices concurred in the result and the Court’s reasoning in full. In
other words, with Garcetti on the books, Lane was an “easy” case—one that
did not split the Justices on any important point.
C. The Lessons of Garcetti and Lane for “Law of Rules” Values
Lane illustrates, above all, that the interpretation of the Court’s rule in
Garcetti offered above is the correct one—only an employee’s work product is
excluded from First Amendment protection, and that this reading of Garcetti
is not a controversial or non-obvious one.192 Given the clarity of the Garcetti
holding, and the care with which the Court’s majority distinguished Garcetti
from Pickering and Givhan, then, what explains the Eleventh Circuit’s reading
of the case? If neoformalists such as Justice Scalia, who signed on to the
majority’s categorical rule, are correct about the virtues of predictability,
uniformity, and the cabining of judicial discretion when courts articulate

190
191
192

Id. at 711 (quoting Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
That said, the Court’s justices still seem to be unable to hold Garcetti’s errant language and its
holding separate when they discuss the case. For a very recent example of this judicial carelessness,
see Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2492 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
In describing the public employee speech analysis, Justice Kagan stated, “[T]he Court first asks
whether the employee ‘spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.’ If she did not—but rather
spoke as an employee on a workplace matter—she has no ‘possibility of a First Amendment claim.’”
Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418). This formulation would be broad enough to exclude the
speech of Givhan and others like her, who speak on workplace matters that are also matters of
public concern while working, where their speech is not made pursuant to their official duties, but
is nevertheless uttered at work. The direct quotes come out of the section of Garcetti Justice Kagan
was citing, which discusses the difference between Pickering, which involved speech on a matter of
public concern, and Connick, which did not. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. But she cites Garcetti,
rather than these two primary cases, for the point, and the “but rather” language is Justice Kagan’s
own formulation of the Garcetti exclusion. Urging a broader reading of the Garcetti exclusion would
have potentially changed the Janus result, but using that particular formulation could also provide
an opportunity for more out-of-context quoting by lower courts, leading to greater expansion of the
Garcetti exclusion.

Dec. 2018]

NEOFORMALIST CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

475

rules rather than standards, then the Court of Appeals should have avoided
its error easily, even notwithstanding prior existing circuit precedent that
appeared to contradict Garcetti’s narrow exemption.
The only plausible explanation is that the Court of Appeals read the
“owes its existence” dictum in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, found it
to be consistent with the language of this earlier case law within the Circuit
(case law that, by distinguishing Pickering and Givhan, Garcetti had abrogated),
and applied it as a holding of the case. As illustrated above, a fair reading of
Garcetti using even the broadest of the competing approaches to holding and
dicta would never have included the “owes its existence” proposition within
the Garcetti holding.193 Therefore, since the Garcetti rule is in the nature of the
rules that neoformalists favor and defend on the grounds of predictability,
uniformity, and the cabining of judicial discretion, the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision, along with the other court of appeals decisions reviewed above
applying other dicta from Garcetti as holdings, stands as stark evidence that
employing a rule-based construction in Garcetti has failed thus far. It also
forms a significant data point in argument against the use of rules in general
to foster the neoformalist values of predictability, certainty, and cabining of
judicial discretion.
The next Part considers a likely explanation for this disconnect between
values and methods—the undue lawmaking deference that the lower courts
afford all of the pronouncements in a Supreme Court opinion—and
interrogates the common justifications for this practice. Based on the
argument above, and the explanation considered below, the lower courts
should reconsider their duty to check the Court’s power from below. They
can do so most effectively by applying the holding-dicta distinction to
Supreme Court decisions, especially decisions that limit preexisting rights
through the development of categorical rules of exclusion. But more
importantly, the Court should be much more mindful of the ways in which
it expresses and crafts its rule-establishing decisions.
IV. THE BREAKDOWN OF VERTICAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Deference and Dicta
From the discussion above, one might conclude that neoformalist
constitutional construction is illegitimate or futile, as evidenced by the courts
of appeals’ broad misapplications of Garcetti’s rule. Of course, Garcetti is one
data point—a test case, chosen for its suitability to the inquiry here,
particularly the fact that it articulated a categorical rule of exclusion where a

193

See supra Section I.C (reviewing the approaches to holding and dicta); supra Section II.B.2 (discussing
the holding of Garcetti).
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balancing test once would have governed the same question. But one case
does not refute an entire theory. In fact, categorical rules do have the
potential to operate, in some cases, to usefully constrain politically or
strategically influenced lower court decision making, and to foster more
predictability and uniformity in the law.194
But this potential is frustrated by the tendency of lower federal courts to
treat the dicta in Supreme Court decisions as though it were binding, or at
least to engage a presumption that, were the issue to come before the Court
again, the dicta in the already decided case would dictate the result in that
later case.195 In other words, the normative case for neoformalist
construction is impaired because the descriptive neoformalist account—that
lower courts generally apply clear rules—appears to be incorrect, at least in
the case where such rules are surrounded by dicta and other errata.
The literature contains several justifications for this lower court deference
to Supreme Court dicta, each of which fails on further examination. Prior
scholarship has contended that, due to its location at the very top of this
hierarchical structure of American courts, its role as a definer of both codified
and federal common law judicial procedural rules (the latter of which include
the rules of stare decisis), and its limited docket of important, national
questions, the Supreme Court may have the ability to designate its own
statements as either holding or dicta without regard to the facts and issues
before the Court.196 When examined, though, each of these propositions is
194

195

196

See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (providing an example of a case that
promulgated a categorical rule that usefully constrains lower courts). Smith, authored by Justice
Scalia, articulated a categorical rule of exclusion from constitutional protection under the Free
Exercise Clause. That Clause’s protections do not extend to those who violate religiously neutral
criminal laws of general applicability, regardless of the burdens imposed on religious exercise. Id.
at 881–82. In the years following, the lower courts have mostly faithfully followed this rule, and it
has clarified and made predictable at least one limitation (that of the general criminal law) on the
scope of religious protections. The Court has also not had to revisit the rule itself due to
misinterpretation, as it did Garcetti. Its predictability and cabining of judicial discretion, rather, has
led to legislative efforts to limit it, and litigation efforts to achieve the result it forbids through other
constitutional strategies. See, e.g., Richard Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise after Employment
Division v. Smith: Same-Sex Marriage, the “War on Terror,” and Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
2009, 210 (2011) (arguing that, due to the durability of Smith’s categorical exclusion, litigants have
turned to creative speech and association arguments to support what would have been free exercise
claims, pre-Smith).
See 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 520 (2018) (stating the proposition that federal appellate courts
are “bound” by the “considered dicta” of the Supreme Court, particularly where it is of “recent
vintage” and not “enfeebled by any subsequent statement.”); Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59,
at 1084 n.422 (citing In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) (making the point that
federal judges should engage in such deference)); see also Scalia, supra note 8, at 1178–79 (making a
similar point).
See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1067 (discussing how, because the Supreme Court sits
at the top of the judicial structure, it might require “greater latitude than other courts in determining
the scope of its holdings” (citing Michael E. Solomine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the
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based on a flawed conception of the role of the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, in a government of distributed powers.
First, the location of the Supreme Court at the top of the judicial
hierarchy does not justify its assumption of powers not belonging to any of
the lower echelons of that hierarchy. Rather, it simply justifies the broad
geographical reach of the Supreme Court’s actual holdings. Where the First
Circuit’s holdings bind only that circuit and the lower courts located within
it, the holdings of the Supreme Court bind all lower federal and state courts.
However, this familiar point does not compel the conclusion that the
Supreme Court must therefore attempt in its decisions to resolve future
questions of law unrelated to the cases it chooses for its docket, or that the
Supreme Court is not required, as the other courts in the system are, to be a
court.197 Instead, it justifies restraint as to these future cases, which have not
yet been argued or briefed for the Court, and which may not have drawn
vigorous advocacy from the parties, due to an inability to affect their own
case’s outcome.198
Where lower courts apply Supreme Court dicta as equivalent to the
Court’s holdings, they cede power to the Court—the law development power
that finds its best expression in case-by-case decision making in the lower
courts. In other words, where lower courts allow propositions reaching
matters outside the facts of a Supreme Court case to be considered part of
the holding, they allow the Court to take issues away from the lower courts
that these lower courts should rightly decide first, resulting in a transfer of
judicial power from the lower courts to the Supreme Court.199

197

198
199

Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 358–59 (2002))). See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article
III’s Case/Controversy Distinctions and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447
(1994) (discussing the limited kinds of cases the Court can hear). Of course, even this view
presupposes that the Court will so designate a controversial statement in question. It did so in
Garcetti, but the later problems in applying the case ironically came from viewing non-designated
statements as holdings. See supra Part III (discussing the misapplication of the “owes its existence”
dictum that led to Lane v. Franks).
Cf. Eric J. Segall, Is the Roberts Court Really a Court?, 40 STETSON L. REV. 701, 702 (2011) (criticizing
the Roberts Court for ignoring the judicial duties of transparency, communication, and grappling
in good faith with prior precedent).
See Leval, supra note 24, at 1261–62 (discussing how a party may not vigorously “assert its best
defense” on issues that have no bearing on the outcome of their particular case).
Of course, this problem, so framed, is not one of constitutional significance, as the Constitution
does not require a system of lower federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. III (requiring a Supreme
Court, but not lower courts, as a judicial branch of government); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting
power to Congress to set up lower courts). Nevertheless, even without a lower federal court system,
this power would not belong to the Supreme Court in the first instance, but to the state courts, who
would, and do today (in most cases) have the same responsibility as the federal lower courts do to
check the Court from below. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”).
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Second, the unquestioned role of the Supreme Court in promulgating
procedural requirements for the federal courts is a poor basis for the
expansion of the Court’s role into a substantive legislative one. Such an
expansion can be rejected solely based on the distinction between procedural
and substantive rules, along with the reality that the Court does not even
possess its procedural rule promulgation power absent compliance with the
Rules Enabling Act, a delegation of legislative authority from Congress.200 It
is important to remember that the Supreme Court’s role in promulgating
procedural requirements is not truly a “legislative” role. The Federal Rules
are subject to legislative approval, and the Court’s rulemaking power is
expressly limited to rules that do not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right.”201 Thus, the Court’s rulemaking power, rather than
forming an analogical basis for affording the dicta of its decisions (especially
its decisions as to “substantive” law) greater deference, actually forms a basis
for the opposite proposition.
A better argument for the quasi-legislative role of the Supreme Court
focuses on the development of constitutional procedural requirements, such
as those for justiciability, the Miranda warning, and the congressional duty to
make an adequate record of constitutional violations before legislating
prophylactically under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment (what
Henry Monaghan famously termed the “constitutional common law”).202
However, the decisions of the Court establishing, for example, requirements
of standing or the Miranda warning refute the argument that the Court
therefore has the duty or power to act legislatively even in these areas. The
standing cases, for example, all developed in the traditional judicial fashion—
in cases that presented plaintiffs lacking concrete and particularized injuries
that were causally linked to the alleged actions of a defendant, and/or which
were subject to judicial redress.203 And the same is true for Miranda v.
Arizona,204 the right to court-appointed counsel, et cetera. These decisions
counsel for a stricter approach to holding and dicta in the lower courts, not
a more deferential one.
Finally, the limited nature of the Supreme Court’s docket is no
justification for allowing it to assume a more legislative role by requiring
lower courts to treat its dicta as binding (or by way of its equivalent, the
preservation of a norm among lower court judges to do so). As an initial

200
201
202
203
204

28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2072 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976)
(establishing, defining, and defending the idea of constitutional common law).
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 62 (4th ed. 2011)
(discussing standing doctrine).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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matter, one must recognize that the size of the Supreme Court’s docket is
overwhelmingly discretionary—the Court could, at any time, increase the
number of cases far beyond the 80 or so it currently decides each year. Thus,
if the Court collectively feels constrained in fulfilling its iterative lawdevelopment role, it has the remedy within its own grasp.205
Beyond this simple practical concern, though, lies a more theoretical
justification for the limited docket of the Court. The finite nature of judicial
resources and the limited time in which the Court must do its business ought
to operate as an assurance that the Court will select for its review only truly
“national” questions—circuit splits, important issues of rights violations in
the states, and structural constitutional issues—not mere “error correction”
cases.206 The idea that only the Court’s holdings in such cases should be
treated as binding places an important check on the temptation of any
Supreme Court Justice to prospectively “settle” all conceivable aspects of
such national issues for all time, even where the case does not present most
of them.
These points take on special significance where the Supreme Court
decides a case by articulating a rights-limiting categorical rule, as it did in
Garcetti. Prior to the Court’s decision in Garcetti, a plaintiff in Mr. Ceballos’s
shoes would have had to fight an uphill battle to have his claim recognized.207
The well-understood interests of a public legal employer to ensure the
correctness and competence of the written legal work of its employees would
have provided it with broad discretion to regulate that work, and the Garcetti
defendants would almost certainly have won their Supreme Court case on
that ground.
But the defendants would have had to make their showing of a
managerial interest strongly enough to override Mr. Ceballos’s speech
interests and the corollary interests of the public in receiving that speech. At
a minimum, the employer would likely would have had to establish that the
content of the speech damaged the mission of the District Attorney’s Office

205

206
207

But see Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1219, 1219–20 (2012) (presenting an empirical analysis tending to show that the
shrinking docket is the result of ideological polarization and the removal by Congress of much of
the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction). Notwithstanding this study and others like it, the
Court’s members do retain significant discretion to increase their docket. They need only come to
agreement to do so, and if they do not, at least in part due to political ideology trumping the need
for law development, then expanding the scope of their lawmaking power in individual cases by
softening the distinction between holding and dicta would seem a particularly poor remedy.
See Chad Oldfather, Error Correction 85 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2010) (discussing how courts move on from
cases without errors).
See Nahmod, supra note 22 (discussing how the Garcetti decision limited the First Amendment);
Secunda, supra note 21 (discussing how Garcetti adopted the foundational principle that public
employees must either be categorized as employees or citizens).
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in fact, rather than in theory or assumedly, as the Garcetti Court opined.208 In
reducing the inquiry to a single question—whether Mr. Ceballos spoke
pursuant to an official job duty—the Court made it so no plaintiff in Mr.
Ceballos’s shoes would ever have the right to demand such a showing. In so
doing, the Court limited the rights of all such prospective First Amendment
plaintiffs from the rights that they possessed under the status quo ante. The
Court certainly had the power to make such a change, which merely was a
choice between the constructive elements of rules and standards. But how
the Court chose to defend and justify its rule only amplified the concerns
discussed above relating to the lower courts’ undue deference toward
Supreme Court dicta.
B. Vertical Separation of Powers
The Honorable Pierre Leval, a judge on the Second Circuit, commented
in a public address on the tendency of lower courts to apply Supreme Court
dicta as case holdings: “Anything the Supreme Court says should be
considered with care; nonetheless, there is a significant difference between
statements about the law, which courts should consider with care and
respect, and utterances which have the force of binding law.”209 Judge Leval
justified this distinction based on the constitutional functions of the judicial
branch, and that more familiar, “horizontal” view of the separation of
powers is almost all of the justification that was necessary.
But the separation of powers also has a “vertical” dimension within the
judiciary, which, unlike the legislative and executive branches, is composed
of a hierarchy of decision makers, each beholden to the one above it.210 This
vertical separation of powers dimension calls upon the members of the lower
echelons in the hierarchy to “check” those on the higher echelons when they
act outside their authority. In the judiciary, that “check” exists in an
adherence to the distinction between holding and dicta.
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See Scott R. Bauries, The Logic of Speech and Religion Rights in the Public Workplace, 19 MARQUETTE
BEN. & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (criticizing the Garcetti decision on this basis).
Leval, supra note 24, at 1274 (2006).
Cf. Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749 (1999). Professor Nourse
introduces the conception of the separation of powers in a vertical dimension, which illustrates
effects that shifting duties among the three federal branches have on the states and the people and
aids in understanding how horizontal conflicts might be resolved more realistically. Id. at 751–52.
The vertical view offered in this Article is distinct from Nourse’s conception because it focuses on
internal verticality within one branch. But it is also consistent with Nourse’s overall project—as
higher courts assume legislative authority by articulating legal rules beyond the cases and
controversies before them, whether through the consideration of non-pertinent hypotheticals or the
phenomenon of over-justification, this shift in power has the effect of moving law development
away from the people. Lower courts can help police this shift by checking the higher courts from
below within their own vertical dimension.
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Where the Supreme Court goes beyond a case that it, in its discretion,
has accepted for review, the Court has assumed a power that it does not
possess—the power of generative, rather than iterative, lawmaking.211 The
judicial power under the Constitution is not one of prospective, general
lawmaking—that power is clearly and explicitly designated as a power of the
legislative branch.212 Of course, all courts make law, but their efforts in doing
so are efforts at resolving “cases” and “controversies” one by one—the power
that the Constitution explicitly designates as “the judicial power.”213 Where
judges make law, then, they properly do so iteratively, as a means of resolving
particular disputes, not generatively, as a means of prospectively governing
transactions and occurrences unlike the ones necessitating the court’s
decision.214
Similarly, where appellate courts dress their holdings up with
justifications that either muddy the waters, as Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Garcetti did, or take account of hypothetical issues not before the court, they
assume power to, essentially, decide matters without taking full responsibility
for deciding them.215 Vertical stare decisis, then, can operate as a limiting
principle in the realm of categorical rules.216 All that needs happen is for
lower courts to read appellate courts’ rules—and especially the Supreme
Court’s rules—carefully and hold those courts to what they have established,
and no more. In this way, the lower courts can act as a check on the Supreme
Court, and the circuit courts, when those courts seek to frame their decisions
articulating rules in ways that obfuscate what those rules actually are.
Cabining rhetoric above is a necessary precondition for cabining discretion
below.
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See Leval, supra note 24, at 1250 (“We judges regularly undertake to promulgate law through
utterance of dictum made to look like a holding—in disguises, so to speak. When we do so, we seek
to exercise a lawmaking power that we do not rightfully possess.”).
Id. at 1259.
Id.
For a thoughtful discussion of generative lawmaking within a dispute resolution process, see
generally Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political
Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004).
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821) (“It is a maxim not to be
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case
in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought
not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The
reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is investigated with care,
and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered
in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom
completely investigated.”).
Leval, supra note 24, at 1282.
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C. Neoformalist Constitutional Construction and the Judicial Craft
However, it is not clear that the lower courts are up to this task. The
pervious Sections discuss several justifications that commentators have offered
for allowing the Supreme Court to define its holdings as broadly as it chooses.
As the analysis shows, each of these justifications fails, but the fact that these
justifications exist lends credence to the idea that lower courts are currently
oriented to give undue respect to every Supreme Court utterance.217 The
broad misapplication of the Garcetti rule in the lower courts supports this
view.218 In the context of categorical rule development, this deference is
dangerous, as it presents the possibility—even the likelihood—that any errant
statement in a majority opinion seeking to justify the Court’s rule in another
way can be construed as another dimension of the rule itself, even if a
selectively quoted section of that justification contradicts the rule itself—as the
“owes its existence” and “course of performing” dicta did in Garcetti.
Lane illustrates very clearly that this danger portends significant confusion
and uncertainty in the application of a categorical rule in the lower courts—
directly contracting the neoformalist values underlying the choice of rules
over standards. Thus, appellate judges—and especially Supreme Court
Justices—who seek to develop constitutional doctrine through categorical
rules should take care to minimize fodder for the justifications above.
This is especially true where the Court articulates a categorical rule that
limits constitutional rights protections. Because the Garcetti rule is a rightslimiting rule, the circuit courts’ expansive applications of it had the especially
pernicious effect of further limiting rights, and in a way that faithful readers of
the Garcetti decision would not have been able to predict ex ante. Considering
the goals of neoformalist constitutional construction—to foster greater
predictability and uniformity in the law by cabining judicial discretion—this
set of results ought to be of concern. If the Court’s majority crafted the
Garcetti rule with these neoformalist goals in mind, but the lower courts
nevertheless went on to apply the rule directly contrary to the reservations,
caveats, and boundaries the Court placed around the rule, then one might
reasonably question the usefulness of categorical rule development in
furthering neoformalist goals.
The remedy for this problem is judicial clarity. Those who truly adhere
to the neoformalist values must nevertheless internalize a healthy skepticism
of the lower courts’ own adherence to their concomitant responsibility to
check the Court from below through strong stare decisis norms and an
adherence to the holding-dicta distinction. The mistake in Garcetti was in the
majority’s speaking only to the dissenters and the respondent, rather than to
217
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Id. at 1274.
See supra Part II (reviewing Garcetti and is misapplication in the lower courts).
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the lower courts that would have to apply the case’s rule. Greater attention
to the task in which the Court was engaged—the development of a rule that
would then have to be applied in numerous subsequent cases below—would
likely have yielded an opinion of more brevity, and more clarity. Unless
lower courts broadly show greater attentiveness to their duty to check the
Court from below, the Court’s remaining neoformalists (and those leaning
that way) must do so for them.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion is somewhat aimed at a judicial audience—
particularly a judicial audience with neoformalist tendencies or sympathies,
one that prefers rules to standards where possible. It argues for two changes
in judicial practice. One is for appellate judges sitting in the “construction
zone”—and especially Justices of the Supreme Court so situated—to take
special care in crafting categorical rules of decision to be applied in the lower
courts. Based on the Garcetti experience, lower courts can become confused
by opinions that over-justify the Court’s holdings, using inconsistent terms
that either expand or contract what the Court intends to hold. In the case of
a restriction on constitutional rights, the Court should take special care not
to issue a holding that recognizes a restriction on rights, but then justify that
restriction using language that arguably broadens it—no matter how clear
the initial articulation of the restriction. This sort of judicial carelessness not
only leads to misapplication in the lower courts, but this misapplication also
has the deleterious effect of even further restricting rights.
This Article’s argument also counsels for deliberate attention in the lower
federal courts to rediscovering their vertical separation of powers function of
checking the Court from below. The courts can do so by adhering to a
stricter version of the holding-dicta distinction as to Supreme Court opinions
than that which they have applied thus far to Garcetti. Such adherence might
first be applied in the context of rights-limiting categorical rules, such as the
rule recognized in Garcetti. There, the case for less deference to errata in the
Supreme Court’s opinions is by far the strongest, as any expansion of a rightslimiting rule inherently contracts the scope of rights even further.
Even outside the more obvious context of a rights-limiting categorical
rule, however, it is important that lower court judges understand that
separation of powers works both vertically and horizontally, and that the
lower courts are often the sole means of checking otherwise unchecked
expansions of lawmaking power in the Supreme Court. Even a decision that
establishes a factor-based standard can needlessly decide issues that the case
before the Court does not present or provide plausible grounds for lower
courts to read the decision that way. It is important, when that occurs, for
lower courts to recognize that their adjudicatory discretion has not been
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constrained on these matters further than the facts of the case will permit.
But one might reasonably ask at this point whether the lower courts
would even want to rediscover that power. Given the extremely lopsided
treatment the Garcetti rule has received, with many more lower court
decisions expanding on its terms than adhering to its narrow scope, it may
be that the federal judiciary is content to allow the Court’s errata to expand
the Court’s rulings whenever possible—at least until a corrective such as Lane
comes along. In fact, based on Garcetti’s progeny, the majority of current
judges may even be eager to see this happen. If so, then conscientious
adherents to neoformalist preferences—at least when sitting in the portion of
the “construction zone” where choices must be made between rules and
standards—would do well to limit, or even completely eliminate or delegitimate, errata in rule-choosing decisions, articulating the holding clearly
and specifically, and eschewing all justifications not strictly necessary to it.
Failing that, these adherents may see virtue in preferring standards to rules.

